Beyond the pandemic

Longer-term considerations for a low oil price environment
No stranger to market disruption, the oil and gas industry faces truly unprecedented times. With historic OPEC+ production cuts and G20 co-ordination neither deep nor quick enough to offset the unprecedented collapse in global crude demand, the West Texas Intermediate benchmark has recently fallen below zero for the first time whilst Brent has slipped to levels not seen during the 21st century.

Oil companies are scrambling to react to COVID-19 challenges – both operationally, to facilitate safe continued operation of facilities, and financially, by assessing liquidity, raising capital, deferring capex and slashing costs – with varying degrees of government support worldwide (please see our Coronavirus Alert Hub for more detail on immediate COVID-19 implications). These issues compound what was an already challenging environment, with increasingly intensified pressure on many players to accelerate a decarbonising energy transition.

 Despite the enormity of near-term issues, a reactive approach is not enough. Industry players also need to prepare longer term for life beyond the pandemic, once COVID-19 restrictions eventually begin to ease. As companies assess wider strategic (or indeed survival) options in anticipation of a sustained low oil price environment, they will also need to plan for the operational fallout of decisions made quickly to ride out the initial phase of the crisis, which may be in conflict with the aspirations of others in the supply chain. Along with survival and dividend considerations, the financial stress and volatility in the industry will present once-in-a-lifetime opportunities for those in a position to capitalise.

The only thing certain in these uncertain times is that those companies that rigorously plan ahead for all eventualities will be best placed to weather the storm. This note considers some of the key legal issues, at both an asset level and a group level, that will be relevant as companies look beyond the pandemic.
Asset-level issues
Emerging from force majeure

Much has been written about a party’s legal ability to suspend its performance under contracts across the energy value chain by claiming force majeure (see our discussion here, for example). Less has been said about what happens once a force majeure event comes to an end.

Force majeure clauses will not allow continued suspension of obligations simply because resuming performance is uneconomical or demand is low.

Those that successfully suspended contractual performance under force majeure clauses should be planning ahead for the resumption of normal operations once mandatory quarantine measures start to be eased.

However, emerging from a force majeure event can be fraught with as much uncertainty as invoking the relief in the first place.

1. Pinpointing the end of the force majeure event is likely to be fertile ground for disputes – particularly where a prolonged force majeure affords a termination right – and questions of causation will once again need to be considered.

2. The implications of the force majeure ending vary widely. Some industry contracts, such as joint operating agreements based on the AIPN model, may provide a grace period for the party claiming force majeure to be restored to its previous position before resuming performance. Others, such as LNG sale and purchase agreements, may contemplate a more immediate return to performance. Some contracts effectively extinguish relevant contractual obligations during the force majeure period, whereas others simply postpone them; some may require third-party contracts entered into to mitigate a force majeure event to be immediately terminated, whereas others may give tolerance for these to be run off.

Much will depend on the drafting of the relevant provisions and each contract, relevant local regulation and situation will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

There could be considerable room for debate in some cases and disputes may crystallise as to where risks associated with industry-wide issues, such as lack of storage, should ultimately fall.

As always, preparation should start with a careful review of existing contractual arrangements and relevant local regulations, considering, for example:

• Would the pandemic legitimately remain the reason for continued impossibility of performance, or is this the result of a by-product, such as the global demand decline or unavailability of storage, which may fall outside the scope of the contractual definition of a force majeure event or be capable of mitigation, even if uneconomic?

• If quarantine and other COVID-19 measures are eased gradually, what will be the trigger point at which the force majeure event ends and normal performance can resume? Is the lifting of government restrictions determinative, or can the company’s own measures to ensure safe operations be taken into account?

• Will a claim of force majeure extinguish relevant contractual obligations or simply postpone them and, if the latter, how does this impact existing contractual arrangements and agreed quantities for future years?

• What actions can companies take now to adjust future commitments in order to mitigate losses and avoid potential force majeure disputes, for example:
  – What can shippers do now to adjust reserved (or, if possible, firm) capacity for future contract years under transportation and processing agreements or similar midstream arrangements?
  – What actions can buyers be taking now to adjust annual contract quantities under sales or offtake arrangements or, for sellers, to...
reinforce booked quantities for future years? Are any ‘make-up’ or ‘carry forward’ balances available to offset against take or pay commitments? How do force majeure quantities feed in to the take or pay formula?

- How can parties best utilise nomination and accounting procedures to take into account any excess production?

- How do allocation procedures operate if different participants in a field, pipeline or other project are affected differently or take a different approach? Where a force majeure event results in only partial performance by a party, are they obliged to make a ‘reasonable allocation’ between counterparties?

- Are any repricing obligations or formulae triggered by a continued low oil price or a claim of force majeure, or could a discretionary price review be triggered? If so, how do they operate – is there an advantage in one party pulling the trigger and gaining first mover advantage, for example?

- Could any existing regulatory regimes requiring open or priority access to infrastructure be invoked, or any new regimes implemented, as a result of excess capacity and the need for storage and other facilities?

- What default arrangements exist if a force majeure claim is disputed or counterparties fail to comply with their obligations without successfully invoking force majeure?
Implementing capex cuts

Exploration and production (E&P) companies have responded to the pandemic by promptly announcing significant capex cuts. For 2020, these generally stand at around 20 to 30 per cent among the majors, whilst others – particularly in US shale – are cutting deeper. Only a fraction of the projects expected to reach FID in 2020 will do so.

However, companies have been less quick to clarify which projects are being suspended. In considering where capex may be cut, companies will need to consider:

- Minimum work obligations under production sharing contracts and other granting documents and existing commitments under work programmes and budgets, including any potential impact of currency devaluation.
- Minimum production commitments, which may require investment capex to achieve.
- The need to maintain the safety of operations, particularly where COVID-19 restrictions resulted in a period of limited or reduced maintenance that may have increased the urgency of maintenance capex or accelerated replacement requirements, and associated regulatory obligations.
- The impact of capex cuts and deferrals on partner and governmental relations, whose co-operation may be vital in this testing environment. Early engagement with partners will be critical. The risk of misalignment and deadlock is heightened as differences between partners’ priorities for capital allocation among assets and geographies emerge. Partners may struggle to agree work programmes and budgets – particularly where a party is in a difficult financial position or adequate financing is unavailable – and some could be at risk of being ‘voted in’ without approval. This risk is compounded where government approval is required, for example in cost recovery regimes (where work programmes and budgets typically require governmental approval) and where governments and national oil companies (NOCs) are partners.

The approach of NOCs and majors to capex costs may diverge – overall capex reductions from NOCs have so far been much smaller, around 10 to 15 per cent. Many Chinese and Middle Eastern NOCs are still pushing hard to increase domestic production and secure international resources.

At the extreme, participants could see the extent or value of their interest in assets eroded if they become subject to default remedies for failing to comply with cash calls or if joint venture partners elect to pursue exclusive operations. Joint venture participants can ensure they are best positioned for future discussions by reviewing their joint operating agreements (JOAs) and examining, for example:

- relevant voting arrangements and approval thresholds;
- deadlock provisions;
- the default regime, including the enforceability of any forfeiture provisions and the consequences for any guarantees or other security required to be provided under the JOA;
- partners’ rights to pursue exclusive operations and any associated implications; and
- the extent of the operator’s authority to incur ‘mandatory’ or ‘emergency’ costs on behalf of the joint account or take other action in the absence of an approved work programme or authorisation for expenditure.
Managing government relationships

Many oil producing countries, for whom hydrocarbon revenues account for a substantial part of the national budget, are ill-equipped to handle the pandemic and are yet to experience its peak. The dual shock of COVID-19 costs and lost oil revenue may see governments face intense domestic political pressure – particularly if elections are forthcoming or the pandemic was seen to be mismanaged.

As well as the potential for disagreement over delayed or cancelled investments, relationships between international oil companies (IOCs) and host governments could be strained if governments take steps to replace revenue lost from falling prices. Steps could include, for example, looking to modify the fiscal regime under granting documents, taking an aggressive approach to tax enforcement (including retrospective action) and cost recovery auditing, exercising farm-in, local participation or back-in rights at opportunistic valuations and/or halting payments by NOCs. Previous agreements or rulings may no longer be respected and the goal posts may be shifted unexpectedly.

From a legal perspective, companies should consider:

- the extent of the protection offered under existing host government arrangements, including any stabilisation regime under the relevant production sharing contract or other granting instrument;
- any additional protection offered under existing national investment laws or international bilateral or multilateral investment treaties, which could afford foreign investors substantive protections under international law, supported by direct recourse through arbitration against a breaching host government; and
- whether any existing investments – and certainly any new acquisitions or investments – can be structured in a way that avails of any protection offered by bilateral or multilateral investment treaties or mitigates changes to existing treaties (see, for example, our discussion of the potential impact of changes to the Dutch bilateral investment treaty regime here).

Double taxation treaties should also be considered – increasingly, these now include arbitration provisions to back up tax authority mutual agreement procedures for dispute resolution, which will give them the teeth they have historically lacked. However, a holistic approach will be necessary and companies should also consider non-legal factors carefully.

Early communication with the right individuals in government could be key and companies will need to protect their social licence to operate. Companies that stand side by side with host governments in their efforts to deal with the pandemic can develop valuable trust, goodwill and long-term relationships with governments whilst engendering public support.

At the same time, companies must remain acutely aware of their ongoing anti-bribery and corruption, sanctions, human rights and other compliance obligations. Our experience shows that, with the weight of stakeholder demand as budget and other financial pressures increase, the risk of fraud, corruption and other misconduct also increases. Now, more than ever, appropriate policies and procedures will need to be in place and actively monitored and enforced.

For further compliance considerations during COVID-19, see here.
A sustained period of subdued energy prices could accelerate the end of the useful economic life of ageing oil and gas fields and infrastructure. Industry participants should review their decommissioning plans and related assumptions accordingly.

Whilst differing approaches to decommissioning security are taken across jurisdictions, the implications of the oil price crash can be expected to be broadly similar. Both credit rating downgrades affecting parent company guarantees and revised pricing assumptions affecting the net value of licence interests relative to anticipated decommissioning costs may result in a costly requirement to provide enhanced decommissioning security, affecting liquidity.

A more detailed discussion of the implications under North Sea decommissioning security agreements is available here.
Group-level issues
Companies will also need to think about how the future will impact on their workforce. There are three particular areas that are likely to need careful thought: the ongoing cost of pension commitments; incentivising the workforce; and managing workforce costs, including through redundancies.

**Pension costs**

Many companies in the oil and gas industry sponsor defined benefit pension plans where the company is responsible for ensuring that the plan is adequately funded to meet the cost of providing the promised benefits. In practice, this often means that the plan is a significant (if not the largest) creditor of the group.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on defined benefit pension plans’ funding will be profound. Assuming that funding levels will not bounce back in the short term, we can expect the effect of COVID-19 to reverberate well beyond the period in which businesses are hit by the severe effects of lockdown and social distancing. The financial and market consequences are likely to be reflected in higher scheme deficits and in increased funding costs for many companies in the sector for a considerable time to come.

The prospect of substantially increased funding costs will present a significant challenge for these companies, which may be looking to conserve cash and repair the damage to their businesses in the wake of the pandemic. Companies may need to think about adopting more creative funding solutions going forward such as using an asset-backed funding arrangement, so that the embedded value of an asset used in the business can be leveraged to generate cash flows for the pension plan in place of contributions being paid out of earnings.

To complicate matters further for the industry, in certain countries such as the UK, major changes are on the medium-term horizon for the regulatory regime governing defined benefit pension plans. New provisions, including the introduction of criminal offences and expanding the powers of the regulator, are expected to significantly impact corporate activity involving groups that sponsor defined benefit pension plans. For example, the focus on ‘equity of treatment’ in the context of dividends between shareholders and defined benefit pension plans will need to be carefully navigated to manage the risk of directors becoming personally liable for plugging funding shortfalls.

The increased level of regulatory scrutiny and market dislocation are also expected to materially increase the cost of managing pension liabilities as part of any post-pandemic corporate restructuring exercises involving relevant companies in the industry.

**Incentive arrangements**

Ongoing market disruption has caused some companies to consider the extent to which they can adjust the terms of existing incentive arrangements. This typically involves considering whether performance conditions that apply to equity arrangements continue to be realistic. If not, there is a risk that senior employees will no longer be incentivised because equity arrangements are unlikely to deliver any value. Performance conditions linked to capex or clean energy diversification strategies are likely to be particularly affected.

Where the effect on performance conditions flows solely from COVID-19, institutional investors are unlikely to be sympathetic towards favourable adjustments or any perception that conditions have been made easier to satisfy. The impact on the market of COVID-19 is not, in itself, seen as a sufficient reason to adjust terms. Remuneration/compensation committees should be guided by the principle that pay should reflect performance and there should be alignment between management and shareholders.

There are, however, wider incentive considerations. The short to medium term is likely to be destabilising for the employee base. Keeping employees motivated will therefore be important, particularly if they are seeing the company implement redundancies across the business (on which, see below).
Cash conservation is likely to be important, so short-term, cash-based retention payments may not be attractive to companies. Companies should consider whether time-based share awards could be utilised, or cash arrangements that have a longer time horizon. We may see other non-cash benefits be introduced or enhanced, for example paid sabbaticals that can be taken when business has returned to normal.

In addition to remuneration, communication with the workforce will be key. Putting in place a detailed employee relations plan to reassure the workforce is important to win ‘hearts and minds’.

Managing workforce costs

Ongoing cuts in capex are likely to require large-scale redundancies at the asset level (and possibly at a group level depending on the scale of the impact). Companies will need to take into account consultation obligations that may arise, which are likely to limit the speed at which redundancies can be implemented. Generous redundancy packages are reasonably common in the sector and will increase short-term costs. If expat arrangements are coming to an end, repatriation costs may also arise depending on a company’s relocation policy.

If the impacts on capex or wider market disruption are expected to be short- to medium-lived, companies may look to alternatives to redundancy to manage workforce costs. Consideration of redundancy alternatives might be particularly attractive given the need to maintain morale in the short term and protect talent in the long term.

Alternative measures to reduce headcount might include implementing a hiring freeze, withdrawing or deferring offers of employment to candidates or restricting recruitment. Reducing the number of agency, temporary and casual staff is often a swift and cost-effective strategy. If one area of the business is less affected by the effects of COVID-19 than another it may be possible to retrain employees with transferable skills to be redeployed into new roles. Arranging for employees to take periods of unpaid leave or annual leave is another way of stopping or reducing work temporarily.

More drastic measures might include cutting wages or salaries, delaying or freezing salary increases, reducing non-cash benefits, suspending bonus plans or changing pension arrangements. Where employees are being asked to agree to such measures, we are seeing executives voluntarily take a corresponding cut to pay or benefits. At the moment, this trend is very much linked to the impact of COVID-19 on company costs. It is debatable whether this ‘sharing of the pain’ will continue on a more long-term basis.

When implementing alternatives to redundancies, companies ought to retain enough flexibility to reverse arrangements on short notice, to cater for improved business conditions. Many of the alternative measures discussed above may contravene contractual arrangements and require employees’ consent, which in more normal times can run a high degree of legal risk. However, in practice, given the current difficult economic times (which are expected to continue for some time), employees may be more willing to agree to changes to secure their jobs. Companies will also need to be mindful of the requirement to inform and possibly consult with employee representative bodies under either national law or any applicable collective bargaining arrangements. In many countries, the pandemic and its aftermath will not comprise a ‘valid defence’ against the obligation to properly engage and consult the workforce in connection with any such measures. A failure to do so could give rise to significant financial and other penalties for companies and their directors.
As well as looking to cut capex, the cash flow impact of a low oil price is likely to lead to further funding requirements for many companies. Majors have already been quick to tap the bond market.

Although equity markets have tended to be bearish towards resources stocks in recent years, particularly in Europe, equity capital markets may nevertheless provide another route to raising funds. Various structures are available, including pre-emptive placings, cash box placings, rights issues, open offers, or convertible or exchangeable bonds. The right approach will depend on a range of factors, including the amount to be raised, the timetable, documentary requirements and the likely attitude of shareholders.

Larger equity offerings carried out on a pre-emptive basis are accordingly subject to fewer (or no) size and discount restrictions. They do typically require a prospectus or similar disclosure document to reach an extended shareholder base and operate on a longer timetable, making them more appropriate for companies with significant funding needs.

Set out below are steps companies can take now to preserve flexibility for equity fundraising in 2020.

• As part of usual annual reporting and accounting processes, starting work on a business description, risk factors, and operating and financial review that may be needed for inclusion in a prospectus in due course.

• Ensuring reserves and resources data compliant with relevant prospectus regulations is available and that companies know who to call upon to produce competent persons’ reports at short notice.

• Consulting with advisers on what financial information-related work may be required in connection with the production of a prospectus and preparing a timetable for this to be completed.

• Looking into how the auditors’ work on the going concern statement may assist the preparation of the working capital report that would be required as part of the various underlying due diligence workstreams, and whether any COVID-19 dispensations regarding working capital statements may be available.

• Analysing the geographic spread of shareholders, as significant numbers in certain jurisdictions may have an impact on the structuring of any equity raising.

• Ensuring that 2020 shareholder resolutions provide maximum flexibility, within the limits of investor association guidance, on allotment authorities and the disapplication of pre-emption rights.
The volatile price environment, and the potential production impact of capex and other spending decisions made today, will also make compliance with continuing listed company disclosure obligations more challenging. Although regulators have shown some sympathy to date regarding disclosure obligations resulting from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including implementing temporary amendments to disclosure regimes in some cases, that forbearance is unlikely to continue for the mid to long term.

Listed companies will need to be vigilant as to whether inside information may be crystallising, for example if a profit or production warning, liquidity issue or significant asset impairment is anticipated — including as a result of a delay or postponement of capex or FID decisions, for example. The possibility of potential defaults and cross-defaults in financing and commercial agreements may also require disclosure analysis. In a situation where future equity capital raises may be required, companies with a clean disclosure history will have a strategic advantage.

For further discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on corporate reporting, see here.
Dealing with debt

All companies will be considering the potential consequences of lower commodities prices for their existing debt financing arrangements. Relevant considerations include:

- the extent of available headroom under committed facilities and whether any conditions to drawdown or draw-stops apply, such as Material Adverse Event conditions or breach of repeating representations;
- the mechanics, timing and consequences of any revaluation or redetermination of the borrowing base under reserves-based lending facilities. It may be wise to approach lenders early – given the inherent practical difficulties of enforcement over illiquid oil and gas assets, lenders may be willing to agree to an amendment or extension of any cure period;
- how their exposure is protected under existing hedging arrangements – including whether such hedging arrangements fulfil minimum requirements in reserve-based lending facilities – and whether future price changes can be mitigated by new hedging arrangements in a cost-effective manner;
- the potential for the low crude price environment and lost revenue to result in breaches of financial or business covenants, for example impact on EBITDA when testing leverage ratios, and any devaluation of assets when testing loan-to-value ratios – covenant relief from lenders may be required;
- whether any repeating representations and warranties can continue to be made; and
- whether any events of default are triggered, considering carefully any de minimis thresholds and grace periods, any Material Adverse Event definitions and any insolvency-related events of defaults.

In addition, companies should consider the potential impact on their lender groups. Existing lenders may bring in new representatives from their ‘business support’ teams and hedge funds and other activist investors may opportunistically buy debt looking to exert pressure or ultimately acquire an ownership interest through the debt. These new entrants may have a more activist agenda than ‘normal’ lenders. Activist investors are very familiar with the legal regime that applies to companies and boards in a time of financial stress and they seek to use that to their advantage.

Companies should ensure steps are in place to actively monitor any changes in its lender group and other debt financiers, including bond holders, to ensure they are not caught by surprise and can engage early if necessary.

For further discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on financing arrangements, see here.
Experience from previous crude price slumps tells us we might expect a period of reduced M&A activity in the oil and gas sector. Yet there are several factors that could drive at least some deal volume, which is expected to accelerate as the virus eases and commodity prices stabilise:

• as pre-crisis hedges begin to run off and the longer-term revenue impact of subdued commodity prices bites, companies may look to disposals of non-core assets as a means of raising funds, reducing net debt and shoring up their balance sheets;
• market consolidation seems likely, particularly among independent E&P players, as companies seek to unlock economies of scale and synergies as a means of lowering production costs and optimising the profitability of assets;
• majors are already committed to significant disposal programmes, with Chevron forecast to sell $15bn–$20bn in non-core assets between 2020 and 2022; ExxonMobil promising $15bn of divestment by 2021; Shell aiming to deliver $10bn from combined sales by the end of this year; and BP expecting to offload $15bn of assets by mid-2021. These strategies will increasingly come into focus, particularly where disposals feed in to energy transition plans and net zero commitments, as discussed below;
• private equity sponsors that have been prominent buyers in recent years may feel pressure to exit their investments or take other steps to realise returns as closed-ended funds approach their latter stages; and
• well-capitalised buyers with bullish outlooks on the long-term recovery of crude prices, including expansionist NOCs with an eye to increasing domestic market share and meeting national production targets, could take advantage of the market disruption to scoop up strategic assets at low valuations or through distressed opportunities.

The market could be challenging for sellers. Volatility, low crude prices and reduced availability of financing will compound existing factors, such as companies and financial investors repositioning for the energy transition, to shrink the buyer universe. Sellers may need to reduce already-tempered price and timetable expectations as they compete for a transaction among a potentially limited pool of buyers. For those contemplating disposals, preparation and efficiency of execution will be the key to maximising the chances of successfully executing a transaction. Sellers looking to steal a march on others might consider taking the following steps:

• Carrying out any necessary pre-sale reorganisation in advance of the sale process rather than as part of it. Even if the sales process does not launch immediately, the assets will be packaged up and the company will have maximum flexibility to move quickly if and when a decision to sell is ultimately taken.

• Ensuring any vendor due diligence is commenced in good time. If marketing to several buyers is contemplated, vendor due diligence reports can increase the attractiveness of the asset, improve the efficiency of the transaction process and make the Q&A process easier for the seller to manage. The preparation of these reports takes time and needs to be commenced well in advance of the formal start of the sales process.

• Thinking about the availability of documents (including any relevant confidentiality restrictions, including with host governments) for a data room and what the process should be for gathering them.

• Carrying out a desktop commercial, antitrust and regulatory review of the change of control provisions, pre-emption rights and government and regulatory approvals triggered by the most likely buyers and considering the challenges and timetable implications of these.

For those contemplating disposals, preparation and efficiency of execution will be the key to maximising the chances of successfully executing a transaction. Sellers looking to steal a march on others might consider taking the following steps:
M&A activity during the 2014–16 crude price crash

Note: Shell’s purchase of BG Group (circa US$70bn) not included in Apr 15

Source: Bloomberg

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• Analysing the tax, accounting, decommissioning, employment and environmental issues that would arise on asset disposals, including options for providing comfort to the buyer that they won’t be hit with expected liabilities.
• Determining what accounts are available for the target assets to help set the pricing structure for the sale and whether any special purpose accounts need to be produced, which could take some time.
• Identifying what services are provided by the seller’s wider group to the disposal assets and what arrangements may be required to enable the disposal assets to operate on a stand-alone basis in the future.
• Developing a compelling narrative for likely preferred bidders when government and/or partner consents are required, including in respect of their financial and technical capabilities and commitment to the relevant project(s) and jurisdiction.

Many would-be buyers may be deterred from deal-making in this environment, given the valuation uncertainties and the need to focus on their own resilience planning. Even more confident buyers will be acutely aware that it may not be plain sailing. However, with attention to detail and ingenuity savvy buyers can navigate the choppy waters.

Below is a list of steps buyers can take to help de-risk transactions.
• A thorough due diligence process will be critical. As well as covering the usual areas, buyers should undertake a targeted review to identify issues that may arise as a result of the pandemic or long-term suppressed crude prices. Take or pay obligations, force majeure and termination provisions, and pricing formulae – particularly where benchmarked to crude prices or where price reviews apply – should be carefully considered. Counterparty credit profiles should be assessed. Scenario planning for upstream and downstream supply chain issues should be run. Minimum work obligations, development plans and other capex requirements, whether already committed under work programmes and budgets or necessary for the future viability of the project, should be carefully analysed.
• Numerous techniques have been used in oil and gas M&A in recent years to bridge valuation gaps. Contingent consideration can be structured around a range of variables, such as commodity prices, reserves or production volumes, project capex or decommissioning costs, and operational or development milestones, to arrive at a fair price depending on how macro events play out though the use of contingent consideration mechanisms on oil and gas transactions is regulated in certain jurisdictions. Vendor financing can allow buyers to spread a portion of the acquisition cost over time whilst earning sellers a return and can be a device to facilitate risk-sharing where the seller’s recourse is limited to the assets being acquired. Forms of non-cash consideration can overcome liquidity issues, including, on a partial sale, the discharge of work obligations as on a farm-in. There is much room for creativity where parties appear at loggerheads over price.
• The transaction structure or perimeter presented by the seller need not be treated as sacrosanct. In the absence of competitive tension, buyers may feel empowered to cherry pick the assets they wish to acquire and those assets and liabilities they wish to leave behind, such as historic portfolio assets with potential liabilities despite no ongoing revenue contribution. Discussions around structures for sharing future decommissioning liabilities, which have become commonplace over recent years, may feature. At the more extreme end, buyers could seek to require sellers to retain an ownership interest in certain assets, to share risks and ensure alignment of interests.
For further discussion of managing the M&A risks associated with COVID-19, see here 🔄

For answers to common questions on merger control and foreign investment reviews during and in the aftermath of COVID-19, see here 🔄

A greater focus on contractual protections in the deal documentation may be warranted. We have already seen a shift towards pricing mechanisms that help parties manage heightened market volatility (such as ‘completion accounts’ rather than ‘locked box’), whilst interim operating covenants (balanced against gun-jumping concerns) take on enhanced importance against a backdrop of instability and extended regulatory approval timelines. Buyers may seek more comprehensive warranty packages to ensure complete disclosure of risks and might feel more inclined to request specific indemnities against identified risks to preserve value. Although deal certainty will likely be one of the seller’s key areas of focus, buyers may look for protection against volatility through conditionality or termination rights (though material adverse change clauses based on general market conditions have rarely been seen historically), including, where relevant, financing ‘outs’. Of course, contractual protection on transactions where assets are acquired from insolvency processes may be far more limited.

Tax losses and other unused tax attributes (such as allowances or unclaimed expenditure) may present an attractive upside, especially in distressed targets. However, tax authorities are sensitive to transactions and restructurings that seek to access losses and other tax attributes, and buyers should be aware of the limits. In some jurisdictions, tax losses are typically forfeited on a change of control. In others, losses can be preserved subject to conditions. For example, the UK loss restrictions on a change of ownership require that there is no ‘major change in the nature or conduct of the trade’ (MCINOCOT) and the business activities of the target have not become ‘small or negligible’. The extent to which a buyer can expect to keep and utilise tax losses and other tax attributes will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and this can inform the acquisition structure. For appropriate non-tax motivated transactions, some tax authorities may also be prepared to give advance clearances.
Planning for a takeover defence

A low oil price environment may lead to activist or opportunistic investors looking to acquire or invest in listed companies at attractive valuations. Potential targets in the oil and gas sector, even those with a strong base of production and proven reserves, may find themselves subject to an approach. As things can move extremely quickly in a public takeover situation, particularly where announcements may need to be made immediately, advance preparation is essential.

We set out below steps companies can take now to ensure defence preparation is in order.

- Working with financial and legal advisers as standing ‘defence’ advisers that can be called upon immediately in the event of an approach. Expert local advice is key and there are bear traps for the unwary in public takeover regulation across the globe.
- Instructing defence advisers to prepare or update a defence manual – this should contain the protocols to be followed in the event of an approach (including key rules of the relevant takeover legislation and dos and don’ts for key individuals who may first receive an approach), key contacts, likely timetables and template announcements.
- Considering whether any pre-emptive steps can be taken to assist a potential future defence.
- In a hostile situation, listed companies inevitably need independent asset valuations of their reserves. Companies should ensure they know who they will call upon to carry out the valuation and be ready to publish a report within days rather than weeks.
- Ensuring that a desktop antitrust and regulatory review of the approvals triggered by the most likely bidders is carried out.
- Ensuring they are familiar with change of control provisions in their key host government, joint operating, commercial and financing contracts and their employee share scheme documentation – including, in particular, approval and consent requirements, pre-emption right analysis and tax considerations.

See our discussion of US companies’ recent moves to implement shareholder rights plans as a ‘poison pill’, for example.

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The impact of the pandemic on the global energy transition is perhaps the most difficult aspect to predict. Before the pandemic hit, companies had started to respond to increasing regulatory, investor and social pressure to move towards a lower-carbon economy.

However, with the low oil price environment presenting an existential threat, companies may shift focus to the nearer term, rather than long-term strategic diversification into clean energy.

With historic low oil prices and depressed electricity demand, renewable energy is under significant pricing pressure, while capex cuts could well impact the investment needed to progress the energy transition. This could be exacerbated by the delay to the convening of COP26, where governments were expected to agree rules for a stronger global carbon market.

Demand for consumer-facing renewable products – including domestic solar installations and electric vehicles, for example – has also begun to fall significantly as a result of the economic downturn. There are also practical challenges. The international supply chain for clean energy components has been harmed by the closure of Chinese factories and the implementation of travel restrictions, which will lead to delays in project completion this year.

In recent weeks, electricity prices in the US, France and Germany have tipped into negative, falling as low as minus €26/MWh.

Despite these headwinds, however, and the temptation to leverage low oil prices as a stimulus to boost the economy, governments’ net zero commitments are unlikely to change, nor are companies’ sustainability reporting regulations.

In the UK, the Oil and Gas Authority has reiterated the importance of achieving the UK’s net zero ambitions and its intention to continue implementation of its existing programme in flexible ways to minimise the practical impact of COVID-19. In fact, the OGA launched a consultation in May 2020 to disapply from its strategy the six-year primacy of ‘maximum economic recovery’ for UK continental shelf assets, and insert net zero as a principal objective, alongside improved ESG governance and the pursuit of CCS. More broadly, the Financial Conduct Authority is pushing ahead with plans for mandatory climate strategy reporting from 2021.

In the EU, although there is expected to be some delay in the EU’s Green Deal policies, these delays are not expected to last longer than a year and the initiative remains a long-term priority – discussions are already starting to regain momentum. We have also seen IOCs themselves, particularly the European majors, re-emphasise their commitment to the energy transition. For example, since the pandemic started, BP has announced a package of measures to become net zero, including a 50 per cent cut in the carbon intensity of sold products, by 2050 or sooner, and Total has unveiled its 2050 net zero commitments. Even whilst announcing a cut to its quarterly dividend for the first time since the Second World War, Shell confirmed its commitment to protecting spending on lower-carbon energy products.

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Demand for consumer-facing renewable products – including domestic solar installations and electric vehicles, for example – has also begun to fall significantly as a result of the economic downturn.

The international supply chain for clean energy components has been harmed by the closure of Chinese factories and the implementation of travel restrictions, which will lead to delays in project completion this year.
Financial investors have so far remained focused on ESG issues and have not yet lost their appetite for low-carbon policies. For example, Barclays and BlackRock have both announced new low-carbon targets since the start of the pandemic. BlackRock has been selected by the EU to advise on the use of ESG factors for governance and risk analysis of EU banks and top-20 ExxonMobil shareholder Legal & General Investment Management has agitated for change citing ‘lack of strategic ambition around climate change’.

Investors may be attracted by the relative predictability of returns of renewable energy projects, to the extent stable returns remain available under long-term power purchase agreements or government subsidy regimes (even where subsidies are being phased out for proven technologies, grandfathering may apply), compared to conventional oil and gas projects that face increasing price uncertainty. Renewable projects can also present an efficient hedging option as part of a balanced portfolio. Nevertheless, as the economic pressures resulting from the pandemic come to bear, governments and investors may shift their focus. Companies should closely monitor governmental and regulatory policy and investor sentiment to ensure their investment mix not only takes into account the short-term impact of COVID-19 but also continues to take into account longer-term planning for a low-carbon future.